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The Meanings of Community

Fernando N. Zialcita



The hunting bow has been used as a musical instrument.
It is possible that the musical bow was adapted from it.

—Bruno Nettl

The popularity of "community" as a unit of analysis in sociology dates back to Ferdinand Toennies (1855–1936) who identified a dichotomy between two types of social relationships: *Gemeinschaft* versus *Gesellschaft*. The first is an intimate relationship between people and finds expression in three forms: kinship, neighborhood, and friendship. The second is a mere coexistence of people independent of each other. While the first is organic, the second is mechanical. *Gemeinschaft* is conventionally translated as "community," *Gesellschaft* as "society" or "association." Historically, community is the earlier type of relationship, but with the emergence of cities, and, within recent centuries, of capitalism, association-type relationships have become dominant. Nonetheless, the difference between the two relationships can also be viewed a-historically.¹ Thus the sense of community shared by a husband and wife becomes a mere association the day they fall out of love. On the other hand, as capitalism intensifies and creates more integrated companies where the distinction between manual and intellectual labor diminishes, association-type relationships may well become a community. This could happen when capitalism turns into its opposite, socialism, where ownership of productive resources becomes societal rather than individual.

The term, "community," has taken various, even contradictory forms in the social sciences. One meaning is geographic and therefore objective. Community can mean a group of locally residing households. Thus such expressions as the "village community" or the "urban community." Another meaning is emotive and therefore subjective. Community would then refer to the mutual sympathy members of a group have for each other and for the village or city as a whole.²

The second meaning makes the use of "community" problematic, for this mutual sympathy may or may not be present among residents of an area. Moreover, even if it is present, not all may share it. Also, some households may not feel sympathy for their neighbors but may be deeply involved with others in another village. To complicate matters further, "community" can be applied not only to households in a given area, but likewise to associations, whether big or small, on the supposition that the members as members share certain basic interests. Thus: the "medical community" or the "business community." Ethnic groups and nations can also be termed "communities." Recently, Benedict Anderson's has characterized the Nation as an "imagined community" (1983).³

The two basic meanings of "community," geographic and emotive, are often confused with each other, especially when referring to rural-dwellers. It is assumed that people in a rural village tend naturally to be sympathetic towards each other and to believe that the village's interests constitute a reality that transcends individual interests. Thus government programs in the Philippines have made the barangay the basic unit in introducing cooperatives, in instituting insurance plans or extending credit. But, as Mary Hollnsteiner (1963, 137) has pointed out, a villager's sympathies are not necessarily co-extensive with the boundaries of his village. Moreover even assuming that mutual sympathy exists among members of a village, they may not necessarily have a developed corporate sense, a sense, that is, of the village as a unit that has interests over and above those of a particular member.

Many urbanites assume that the Filipino in his pristine, authentic condition has been "community-oriented" but has lost this because of "Western individualism." Thus the Filipino is admonished to recover the value of *bayanihan*. The question, however, is what sort of community is this towards which many Filipinos, are *in fact* attuned? Is it merely the circle of kin, neighbors, and friends? Or does it include even those with whom he has no ties, but who either reside in the area or have a stake in it? Is there room for the nonrelative or the non-friend, in other words, for the Stranger? Gelia Castillo says that bayanihan really consists of mutual help and exchange labor between close kin, friends and neighbors to favor one family or person. It has little or nothing to do with community-mindedness (1981, 452).

Two recent studies on peasant villages in Asia by Jeremy Kemp (1988) and Jan Breman (1988) likewise question this confusion of "community" with "village." They claim that, particularly in South-

east Asia, Western administrators and ethnographers over the past century and a half have tended to look at the peasant village as a corporate entity where a strong sense of solidarity has always prevailed, especially in the precolonial period. Citing a variety of historical and ethnographic data, they sketch a more complex picture where, for instance, communitarianism and lack of individualism are not necessarily the reigning norms.

Discussions of community among scholars, development workers, and nongovernment organizations assume that the community is a type of group: people who co-reside in an area and participate in common activities that foster social cohesiveness, solidarity, and mutual concern. The area could be a village or a town. Also assumed is that the members willingly work together for a common good, regardless of their kin ties, and are open to other communities whether in the immediate locality or in the region. While this is a vision I personally would like to see happen in the Philippines, it is a vision of an *ideal* condition rather than of actuality.

This article seeks to show that the concept of community may have a different meaning or sets of meanings among three peoples in the Philippines who differ from each other: the Ilocanos of the Ilocos Coast, the Ilongots of the Sierra Madre mountains, and the Tausugs of the Sulu archipelago. Ilocos has been exposed to Western Christian influence since the late sixteenth century while Sulu, as the first state to develop in the archipelago, has been exposed to currents of thinking from the Islamic world since at least the fourteenth century. On the other hand, while the Spanish during the nineteenth century and the Americans during the early twentieth century attempted to change the Ilongots' traditional way of life, they were largely unsuccessful. The Ilongots retained traditions which can be shown to have been common in what came to be called the Philippines at the advent of colonialism. I thus examine a "truly indigenous" form of community, one not transformed by outside, especially Western, influences. The Ilongot case is certainly indigenous in this sense. On the other hand the Moslem Tausug, who have traded with Western powers for centuries, have really been exposed to Western cultural influences only in this century.

Another purpose of this article is to show that the sociocultural system plays a crucial role in shaping the meanings of community. To speak of "community" is to speak of a notion, a way of conceiving social relations. But a notion does not appear in a vacuum. It responds to an existing complex of relationships. The urbanite, whose

work compels him to mix constantly with people who are neither kin nor friends and who is dependent for his advancement upon a nationwide labor union he belongs to, will most likely have a notion of community different from that of a rural-dweller whose work rarely takes him outside his village or even his neighborhood. Thus it is important to examine the sociocultural system of the three peoples under discussion. Again there is a contrast. While the rural Ilocano and Tausug are peasants professing membership in universal religions and heeding the orders of a state, the Ilongot are independent farmers who practise their own local religion and have hitherto managed to ignore the Philippine state.

It is often said these days that "Western individualism" has destroyed the Filipino's "Asian communalism." Japan is the favorite alternative model. Unlike the Japanese who have a strong sense of community, Filipinos supposedly suffer from the malaise of Western-induced individualism. They will be saved if they return to their "Asian" roots. However, an "Asian vs. Western" dichotomy, especially when applied to the Philippines, misleads, because it ignores contrary data. It is more fruitful to examine particular Philippine societies and their notions of community in relation to specific aspects of their sociocultural system.

This article compares three cultures in the Philippines on the basis of the following aspects of their social system: 1) The economy and ecosystem; 2) The kinship system; 3) The polity; and 4) The religion

The main features of their various systems will be described and analyzed holistically. Though such an approach can lead to superficiality, it can articulate better the context which encourages a particular notion of community to appear.

"Community" will be defined here as a group whose members believe that they share basic interests with each other which they share with no other, express these beliefs and sentiments through common activities and tend to interact positively with each other. I am thus building on George Homans' theory of the small group which has three elements: activities, interaction, and sentiments. Activities are things people do (Homans 1950, 34) such as eating, planting or celebrating. For a group to exist, it must have shared activities. In such activities, it is important to know who participate and who are excluded, and how are such activities organized whether dyadically or corporately. Interaction refers to the manner in which some unit of activity of one person is stimulated by some unit of activity by another (Homans 1950, 35). Thus, when planting together,

two people interact. They also interact with those with whom they do not have any shared activities. It is important to know with whom negative interactions, that is, conflict whether overt or covert, take place. Both patterns of cooperation and conflict influence notions of community. Sentiments or feelings are assumed by Homans to be influenced by both interaction and activities. Frequent interactions in common activities encourage participants to like each other. In turn, such sentiments encourage more interaction and common activities. A community can be defined as a group that is more cohesive than ordinary groups because common activities abound, interaction is positive and frequent, and members feel they belong.

To connect the social system and notions of community, various types of groups available in each society will be inventoried. The aim is to show that the social system makes certain types of group possible, others impossible. Two groups not included in the inventory are the ethnic group and the Philippine nation-state because they would complicate the analysis. The state is, in fact, a key variable in explaining differences between inventories.

Data for the three cases come from ethnographies written by various authors, mostly anthropologists. The ethnographies are all contemporaneous, for their data were gathered between the late 1960s and the 1980s. Data for the Ilocos are largely based on fieldwork which this anthropologist, a non-Ilocano, conducted in three villages in 1978–79, 1987–89. The article goes from the Ilongots, to the Tausug, then to the Ilocanos. The sequence is not meant to be evolutionary. The Tausug and the Ilocano cases can be seen as alternative ways of organizing a society where a state is present. The sequence begins rather with the unfamiliar and ends with the familiar.

The Kin as the Universe

Though they were numerous in the past, pestilence at the turn of the century reduced the Ilongot population. In the 1960s, they totalled only 2500 individuals living in the forest-covered western foothills of the Sierra Madre range (Rosaldo and Rosaldo 1975, 103). Though few in number, the Ilongots should be discussed for several reasons. Unlike the Tinguian or the Bontoc, the Ilongot relied on swidden cultivation up to the late 1960s, and thus continued a tradition that was the norm in much of the Philippines at the time of Spanish contact except in parts of Luzon which were practising wet-

rice cultivation.⁴ Moreover, their small, scattered settlements also fit in with a pattern that probably was common throughout the uplands of the islands during the sixteenth century. Finally, it is fruitful to contrast them with Ilocanos, fellow residents and contemporaries on the same big island of Luzon.

I do not claim that the Ilongot typify early Philippine society. Patterns among the many Philippine societies at Spanish contact were various. All one can say is that the Ilongot way of life continues some basic patterns from previous centuries.⁵ The kinship system among the Ilongots, as among other Philippine and Austronesian peoples,⁶ is bilaterally oriented, that is, descent is traced through both parents. The individual has two sets of relatives: mother's and father's. Generally the Ilongot couple prefer to dwell near the wife's relatives. Characteristic of bilateral systems is the kindred. These are relatives that an individual either feels close to or can rely on for support. This is really more of a category rather than a group, for each individual draws from it a group according to the occasion (Freeman 1968; Murdock 1968, 239-40). Being basically ego-centered, there are as many kindreds as there are individuals. Kindreds play an important role among the Ilongot.

Traditional Ilongots rely heavily on long-fallow swidden cultivation which has been possible in the dense forests of the western side of the Sierra Madre. Intercropped with their plots of rice are manioc, sweet potatoes, bananas, or sugarcane. Because swidden cultivation cannot be carried out indefinitely on a fixed plot of land without wearing it out, new patches of forest are cut and burned annually. Aside from farming, the men hunt, fish in the rivers, or gather forest plant foods. Trade with Tagalog- and Ilocano-speaking outsiders, plays an important role in their economy. They supply outsiders with meat and fowl in exchange for bullets, liquor, cloth, salt, and knives (Rosaldo and Rosaldo 1975, 103-4).

The central role played by swidden cultivation can account for two features of their system. One is that land is regarded as a free and public good, open to whoever wishes to clear a portion of the forest. It is not owned individually. When cultivated, land and its yield are regarded as possessed by the cultivator. But his rights expire when he abandons the patch and clears another in the forest (Rosaldo and Rosaldo 1975, 104; R. Rosaldo 1980, 277). This does not mean, however, that the forest is "communally owned"—to use that misleading term—by the Ilongot. The other feature is the impermanence and fissiparousness of settlements. After a number of years, a habi-

tation site is abandoned. Houses are moved closer to where the new gardens have been opened. Moreover, households that have been neighbors for many years may drift apart for the same reason. However, precisely because clearings for swidden gardens are transient, it is equally possible for groups that have been separate to merge together (R. Rosaldo 1980, 230, 281).

The maximum political entity is the *bertan*. This key expression has several meanings. One use refers to a grouping of several settlements. The Rosaldos counted 13 such *bertan*. The population of individual *bertan* ranged from 64 to 307, their mean population was 180. Each settlement consists of 4 to 9 households, 5 to 15 nuclear families, and 40 to 70 persons. Groupings are differentiated from each other partly by dialect. Though a universal Ilongot is spoken by all, there are significant dialectal variations from one grouping to the other. *Bertan* are also divided from each other by marriage preference. The ideal, not always realizable in practice, is to select one's partner from within it. The *bertan* is the maximum unit that an aggrieved party can call upon to initiate a raid in response to an attack by outsiders (Rosaldo and Rosaldo 1975, 103-4; R. Rosaldo 1980, 223-28).

Men skilled in oratory, genealogical knowledge or traditional norms are admired. Such leaders, however, can only persuade. They do not exercise coercive powers over those of their settlement. Instead they should be adept in building group consensus. During conflicts between settlements or between *bertan*, leaders cannot compel disputants to an agreement. At best, during extra-settlement peace meetings, orators, who represent their local group, pit their persuasive skills against each other. "Ideologically all men are equal, and no political specialist or leader exists" (Rosaldo and Rosaldo 1975, 105).

Since no superordinate authority can compel resolution of a dispute, violent conflicts between settlements can last for decades. A frequent cause is the desire to take a head. For young men, cutting off a head marks their entry into adulthood. This is not connected with acquiring power over other settlements, nor exacting revenge, nor with ensuring an abundant crop. Head-taking raids can be launched against anyone from outside one's *bertan*. The potential victim could be Ilongot or non-Ilongot, male or female, old or young, stranger or acquaintance. A prize is the right to wear a pair of dangling hornbill earrings. Another reason for taking a head is connected with a death in the household for whatever reason: execution, illness, or old age. The burden of sorrow cannot be lifted without sallying forth and killing someone outside the *bertan*. Additional reasons are the

desire to avenge an insult or for the aged to feel young again (R. Rosaldo 1980, 140, 156-57; M. Rosaldo 1980, 148-51, 157-58).

The reader may well dismiss the Ilongots as another isolated, exotic people with peculiar customs. He should note, however, that the custom of killing someone from outside one's circle in order to either validate manhood or to end mourning rituals after a death in the kin has been an important tradition in many places in island Southeast Asia well into this century.⁷

The egalitarianism of Ilongot society permeates its religious system. While only a few persons are shamans who can diagnose and cure at major sacrifices, preside over special chants, and summon the souls of headhunting victims, anyone cured by a shaman "shares in his spirit's power and can conduct minor ceremonies with its help" (Rosaldo and Rosaldo 1975, 106). Significantly enough, this system of beliefs is characterized by the Rosaldos as being "individual-oriented" (1975, 106). The cult of the ancestors is not important. And ceremonies, other than headhunting, peace-making rituals and occasional sacrifices for severe illness, are "rarely communal" (1975, 106). When the Rosaldos first stayed with the Ilongot, missionizing activities by a Christian church had begun to attract converts. Since then the number of Christian converts has increased. But there are still young men who resist because of their desire to take a head (M. Rosaldo 1980, 158).

Ideally individuals should marry relatives within the bertan and reside within it. Thus R. Rosaldo cites the case of Lakay and Baket who both hailed from the bertan called Rummyad. This bertan had six residential clusters. Lakay came from Kakidugen, Baket from Pengagyaben. Being children of half-brothers, they were classificatory siblings. They encouraged their children to marry each other. During 1955-58, four such marriages took place. These were marriages between "second cousins." Moreover there were three marriages between people of adjacent generations. The grandparent of one had been the sibling of the great-grandparent of the other. These were "uncle-niece" and "nephew-aunt" marriages. Said one Ilongot, "Let us fill this place of ours with our siblings, so that we who are alike cluster in one place and none will go and mix with enemies. In that way, our children once again will be siblings and we will have nothing to fear in our place" (R. Rosaldo 1980, 210).

In actual fact, Ilongots do alternate between marrying outsiders and marrying insiders (R. Rosaldo 1980, 211). Availability of marriage partners, individual choice, and the need to cement a peace

agreement are other factors that intervene. Close marriages plus proximity of residence foster shared labor and other activities between households. Such activities like planting or harvesting appear to be organized dyadically, that is, one household engages the help of another or several others for a specific task (R. Rosaldo 1980, 216–17, 280).

The bertan's unity is not based on corporate ownership of land, nor on a single pyramid of authority. Its unity is based rather on a shared history of living together over a series of residential moves. It is thus never permanent, its social boundaries never fully circumscribed. As groups within it draw closer to each other, another group may hold back and even fall away. Thus as the Kakidugen and the Pengegyaben united, another residential group within Rummyad, the Ringen, grew increasingly distant. Bangkiwa from Ringen had wanted to marry Midalya, daughter of Baket. But Baket had refused, partly because of his age. Frustrated, Bangkiwa sought—unsuccessfully—to behead Midalya while she was at a garden. (R. Rosaldo 1980, 214). Most likely, given the demands of swidden cultivation, unions such as the Kakidugen-Pengegyaben will eventually disperse. However, at another generation, they may again regroup.

To those outside his bertan, the traditional Ilongot feels neither a sense of obligation, nor a sense of fellowship even if they be fellow Ilongot. As was pointed out above, headhunting raids can be launched against them. In the 1950s, Ilongots came to an agreement that they should raid only lowlanders. But one Rummyad, Luku, was seized by "envy" when he saw two of his brothers with red hornbill earrings. So in 1952 he beheaded a Butag man who went hunting with his dogs (R. Rosaldo 1980, 165).

The bertan is conceived of as a single unity. Whatever one member does involves the whole bertan, even if they are not involved in any way. Death is not inflicted only on those individuals directly connected with the culprit (R. Rosaldo 1980, 251). Anyone related, because of kinship, no matter how distant, or because of a shared bertan name, is liable for beheading. Even children are vulnerable (R. Rosaldo 1980, 235).

A notion which may gain importance among the Ilongots is that of belonging to an ethnic group, the Ilongot, which has an identity vis-a-vis outsiders. Thus far the frequency of raids against fellow Ilongot, shows that this notion has little relevance for everyday relations. However, more and more non-Ilongot are settling in the vicinity and are staking their claims to parcels of land. In 1974, officials of the Philippine government flew to Ilongot country to

promote a pan-Ilongot political federation (R. Rosaldo 1980, 288). Eventually the notion of belonging to a "pan-Ilongot" group may become possible.

Brothers by Blood, Brothers in Faith

The Sulu archipelago is a chain of islands extending from Mindanao in the northeast to Borneo in the southwest. The social pyramid has three layers; each is both an ethnic group and a social class. At the top are the Tausug, below are the Sama. Lowest of all are the Sama laut or sea-faring Sama, commonly called Bajau who generally reside in boathouses. The kinship system of the Tausug is bilateral in descent. However, in practice, land rights go to the men. Because of this, a married couple eventually takes permanent residence in the husband's place of origin where his other brothers and cousins live (Kiefer 1975, 3-4).

The Tausug are farmers who cultivate rice without irrigation on permanent fields (1972, 14), and supplement this with fishing and coconut farming. The latter brings in cash for purchasing necessary items of daily use. Trade, whether domestic or international, has for centuries played an important role in the Tausug economy. Sulu has been famous for its marine products, such as pearls and birds' nests.

All landholdings are individual. Such rights as the right to usufruct, titular rights, and rights of tenancy are exercised by individuals. By tradition, however, ultimate rights reside in the sultan as the head of the state and in regional and local headmen as his representatives. Kiefer notes, however, that for practical purposes, this was a legal fiction (1972, 3). But water-holes, grazing land, mosque land and beaches are not, by tradition, individually owned. Wilfredo Arce, however, takes exception to the inclusion of mosque land in this list (1963). He says that mosques may in fact be owned by private families. This may be relevant to an understanding of notions of community, as will be seen. Kiefer notes that individual ownership of swamp land and forest land can be individually owned only if they are continuously used and improved (1972, 3).

Two politico-legal systems intersect in Tausug society: one the traditional, the other that imposed by the Philippine state.

Headmen are regarded as the primary representatives of "the Law," meaning, the law which was derived from the Koran plus those traditions that interpret it (Jundam 1981, 103). A Westerner, or

any Catholic or Protestant today for that matter, will distinguish between "religious" and "secular" obligations. In fact both types of obligations are embraced by "the Law" as understood by the Tausug. The ultimate defender of the Law is the Sultan. Although the headman receives his title from the Sultan, he derives his power from the number of followers he has: from persons who will support him both militarily and economically. Thus, the authority of a Tausug headman depends on the probability that his followers will choose to remain faithful. His power, however, is exercised over people rather than over territory (Kiefer 1972, 93).

Above all officials is the Sultan who is "the highest datu, the highest religious official, and the highest legal authority" (Kiefer 1972, 107). While the sultanate today is no longer a sovereign state, there are rights that have traditionally been associated with it. The more pertinent ones would be: the right to control both territory and subject peoples and the right to mediate private warfare and feuds. As the ruler, the sultan had the right to eliminate internal strife. The authority of headmen, (as differentiated from their power) emanated from the Sultan. But while headmen were charged with keeping order in their respective settlements, the sultan kept order in his realm by mediating between conflicting headmen (Kiefer 1972, 111).

This traditional politico-legal system intersects with the Philippine system. The island of Jolo is divided into eight municipalities with elected officials in each. Elected, too, are the provincial governor and the representative to congress. As elsewhere in the Philippines, elected officials have been able to use their position as channels of government largess to build their own power base (Kiefer 1975, 5).

Traditionally, Tausug society distinguished between the *datus*, who enjoyed high status, and ordinary commoners. In the past, permanent slaves, often drawn from the Visayas, constituted a lower level (Kiefer 1975, 5). The Tausug social pyramid is in turn superposed on the Sama and the Badjao.

The Tausugs are Moslems. Islam is sufficiently well-known to need no explanation. What is relevant for our purpose is that Islam came to the Sulu Archipelago through trade around and by the late fourteenth to the fifteenth century had inspired the formation of the first state in what came to be called the Philippines (Abubakar 1981, 18). Since Islam has always stressed linkages to a wider community, within this century, contacts between Tausug and their co-religionists especially in Arab countries have increased. More foreign missionar-

ies visit the islands. In exchange local students and migrant workers travel to Arab countries.

The settlement pattern for the rural Tausug can be described as consisting of a series of concentric circles. In the case of Kiefer's Tubig Nangka, the circles and their number of households are:

1. A cluster of two or more houses.
2. The *lungan* or hamlet which is a large, dispersed cluster of houses held together by overlapping bonds of kinship.
3. The *kauman*⁸ which embraces several hamlets. Across hamlets, the residents are likewise related by kin ties. They are led by a headman with an official title from the sultan. Tubig Nangka numbered fifty-nine houses and had one major hamlet with twenty-eight houses.
4. The region which groups together several kauman. In the past, Jolo had five traditional regions. Over each was a single powerful headman.
5. The island of Jolo.
6. The world of believers, Dar-ul-Islam, which extends over a wide expanse of the globe.

The social entities with which the rural Tausug identifies are several. The individual's bilateral kindred is important. To them he turns for help in harvesting the crops, for solace during trials, for care during illness or for protection and support in case of conflict. At life crisis rites—weddings or funerals—he expects them to rally to him. Such activities are most likely dyadically rather than corporately organized (Kiefer 1972, 31, 105). He is given help in the fields by particular kinsmen, he is cared for, when ill, by a particular cousin. The kindred thus yields particular groups. But it does not own land in common.

Within the kindred itself, there are two categories: a man's close kindred (*usbawaris*) and his distant kindred (*campung*). The individual's first cousins constitute the limits of his close kindred; second cousins and beyond are regarded as distant. It is the close kindred that a man can rely on for support in case of feuds. Feuds are possible with second cousins and even more distant relatives, but not with first cousins. Kiefer (1972, 30) cites the conflict between Asi and Ibnu. The latter was the nephew of Asi's wife. One day he noticed that Asi's fence intruded on the path leading to Ibnu's house. Angry

words were exchanged. Ibnu drew his sword, Asi hit him on the head with a stone. Unfortunately Ibnu died. His father, brother and first cousins sought vengeance. But both they and Asi's close relatives dwelt in Tubig Nangka. Conflict was averted when Asi's brother offered to cover the cost of the funeral and when Asi's cow was slaughtered for the funeral feast.

A second distinction operates within the kindred. A man's patrilineal relatives are generally more important to him than those of his mother because he resides in his father's settlement (Kiefer 1972, 31-32). This seems to suggest that the most basic alliance group is that made up of brothers or male first cousins living close to each other. Here is where a sense of community most likely flourishes rather than in the *kauman* as a whole.

Outside the kin are a man's friends all over the island. Men develop these ties so that they can travel in relative safety to other parts, for neither the sultanate nor the Philippine state has effectively prevented violence in the post-World War II period. Loose firearms proliferated without permission (Kiefer 1972, 61). Still friendship is subordinate to kinship. "He is much more than a friend to me, he is also my kinsman," say the Tausug (Kiefer 1972, 65). Moreover, a man's friends do not constitute a group, for they may not know each other. They merely form a network.

Equally important for the Tausug are larger supra-kin groups such as the Sultanate, Islam, and the Tausugs taken as an ethnic group. To be Tausug is to be Moslem, to be Moslem in turn is to live under a sultan. Islam has introduced the Tausug to an international fellowship of believers. Even if the average rural Tausug knows little about geography, he knows that a once-in-a-lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca where he will mix with non-Tausug is a pillar of his faith. And there are those outsiders, some brown-skinned like him, others white, who visit his island and share his faith. Islam and the Sultanate have created the basis for a broader sense of community for which many Tausugs have given up their lives, fighting Christian infidels. Kiefer emphasizes that the corporate group is absent among the Tausug (1972, 105). Perhaps this should be qualified. The Sultanate with its claim to ultimacy in titular rights is a corporate group. Kiefer may be right, however, in noting the absence of such groups below the level of the state and in stressing the importance of dyadic relationships: that of friend to friend, relative to relative or follower to leader.

Kindred, Neighborhood and Associations

In the Ilocos, the Cordillera, that enormous bony spine of northern Luzon, presses close to the sea, creating narrow stretches of flat land. The scarcity of farmland has compelled the inhabitants to migrate to other regions. As a result, Ilocanos constitute the third largest linguistic group in the islands. The Ilocano kinship system is bilateral. However, there is a tendency in some areas to pass on riceland only to the men on the assumption that they will till it and will need it as an offering to their spouses-to-be as bridewealth. One result is that couples tend to reside where the groom comes from. But patrilineality in inheritance does not sit well with some of my male informants in two villages. They believe that their daughters should likewise inherit riceland. The inheritance system seems to be in flux.

The principal occupation is wet-rice cultivation using the plow and draught animals. In some areas, tractors are becoming common. Secondary products are Virginia tobacco and garlic which are both sold for cash to people from the city. The secondary forests on the low-lying hills supply firewood to the villages. To supplement their modest income, many take non-farm jobs in the provincial and national capitals. Many have also migrated either temporarily or permanently to places abroad. The Ilocos is thus closely tied in with the national economy.

The formal political and administrative system in the Ilocos is the same as elsewhere in the lowland Christian areas, or in the Moslem areas for that matter. What was described earlier for the Tausug applies in the Ilocos as well. Several barangay or barrios make up a municipality, which in turn group together to form a province. Officials at all levels are elected but are under the supervision of the national government. Alongside this is the Philippine court system reaching from the capital down to the municipality. The judges are all appointive.

Like most lowland Filipinos, the majority of Ilocanos have been Roman Catholic since the seventeenth century. There are, however, other churches such as the Philippine Independent, the various Protestant churches, the Iglesia ni Kristo, and the Rizalistas. Save for the last, these churches are organized hierarchically on a nationwide basis. Membership therefore brings the individual in contact with others outside his immediate circle of kin and familiars.

Positions in the highly pyramidal, social hierarchy are based on ownership of land which is generally owned individually. Possession

of status symbols and connections with politicians further enhance such positions. There are those regarded as relatively wealthy, average or in-between, and the poor.

Groups in the Ilocos are various. One important type is those drawn from the Ego-based kindred (*kapuunan*, *kaputotan*) for various phases of the farm cycle, for providing solace and encouragement, and for participating in the rituals at turning points in the life cycle: baptisms, weddings, funerals. Intermarriage with close kin, sometimes first or second degree cousins on either side or with a father's brother recurs regularly in some areas in order to keep land within the kin (Zialcita 1989). These naturally create more common activities. These kindred based-groups do not have a corporate character. However, in Teppang and Karayan, two villages I stayed in south of Laoag, there are kin groups that own pieces of riceland and tracts of forest as corporate units (*komun*). But residents at Rangtay, a village north of Laoag, marvelled at this, for they believed that such arrangements may, in fact, invite quarrels over the allocation of work. For the most part, forms of cooperation between the individual and his kin are dyadically organized. That is, he may call on his maternal first cousin for help in his field or in preparing the meat dishes for his daughter's wedding, but not necessarily on the others. Other important groups are residentially based and thus have clearer boundaries. One is the *purok* or *sitio* which is a neighborhood often divided from others by natural boundaries such as fields, orchards, or streams. Households in each neighborhood are often related to each other by blood or marriage. Food is exchanged regularly between neighbors and relatives. Bigger than the *purok* is the *barrio* or *barangay* which is the smallest administrative unit of the Philippine state. Indeed this is probably the unit implicitly referred to when urbanites use the term "community." The Marcos government tried to strengthen *barangay* identity by delegating to the Barangay Justice System the mediation of cases that previously were brought to the municipal courts and by creating the Samahang Nasyon or precooperative in every *barangay*. Above the *barangay* is the municipality in whose town proper or *poblacion*, government offices, schools, the marketplace, and the church are all located.

The degree to which each of these three administrative units has a definable and palpable form as a group varies from place to place. Neither the *purok* or *barangay* corporately owns land. Thus the presence or absence of common activities depends to a large extent upon the actions taken by either the officials or the people. An example is

when the barangay officials go from house to house soliciting contributions for the family of any deceased resident.

In the three barangays studied, the barangay as a whole had by-laws (and sanctions) governing the relationships of their members all the way from keeping the roads clean to avoiding loud noise at night. Periodic meetings were held at which attendance was obligatory under penalty of a fine. Teppang and Karayan and three barangays in their district conducted an annual fund-raising campaign, under the guise of a popularity contest, where the winner was proclaimed Queen of the District. The contestant who brought in the most number of contributions won. Part of the income went into a project that benefited the district members. Past projects have been: a high school, a marketplace, an assembly hall, a scholarship fund. But part of the income also went into the winning barangay's fund. The competition does foster barangay loyalty. Rangtay did not have a district fiesta, but it had a regular party organized by the youth on New Year's Eve every year. Sometimes there were fund-raising dance parties for co-villagers who found themselves in an emergency.

Within the Ilocano barangay, the various purok that compose it may have their own exclusive associations, again with their own bylaws and sanctions and their own elected leaders. These purok allow members to borrow both money and cooking utensils from the association for important feasts, thus strengthening solidarity among the members. Since Karayan has two purok, it has two associations.

The sense of belonging to a municipality is fostered by the fact that the townhall, the municipal high school, the marketplace, the cockpit, the cemetery, and the Catholic Church all cluster at the town proper. However, because Teppang and Karayan were separated by a river from the town proper, their district had many small chapels belonging to various churches, a marketplace and a high school. Still, it is in the town proper where the municipality's ritual celebration of its identity, the town fiesta, is celebrated.

But interactions between purok, between barangay, or between barangay and town proper can be laden with suspicions. A farmer friend in Karayan, Eliseo, used to warn me about going to another purok within his barangay because "there were some bad people there." When visiting friends in another barangay, I encountered similar reactions about other purok in their barangay. Sometimes, the bad people are supposed to be "sorcerers" (*mannamay*) who have made their neighbors sick. At other times the hostility develops from the daily, physical isolation of one purok from the other. The Nydeggers

noted, in their study of child-rearing in an Ilocano village, that parents encouraged their children to mix with their fellow purok/sitio mates and ignore those from other purok/sitio, even from the same village (1966, 154).

Not surprisingly, accusations about sorcery and other evil deeds are exchanged between barangays. Raul Pertierra, in his study of a municipality in Ilocos Sur, observed that a barkada seldom includes members of different barangay. "They attend social functions as groups, and the presence of several barkada is often the cause of fights" (1988, 66). Today "only male adolescents conduct organized raids against other barrios" (1988, 66). In the barangays studied by this writer there were no such raids. A potential enemy, too, are people from the town proper. They are regarded with unease by villagers because of their snobbishness. Up to the 1940s, barangay residents could easily be identified as not being from the town because of their handwoven striped cotton garments. They were looked down upon and were not received in the living rooms.

The solidarity people feel as members of a purok, a barangay, or a municipality may thus be situational. Though Eliseo of Karayan is suspicious of those in the other purok in his barangay, he and they work together when competing against other barangay during the annual popularity contest. Similarly, despite his reservations about another barangay down the road, he and its officials have worked together in organizing projects beneficial to all the five barangays in his district. Moreover, they band together when making demands on the mayor and his officials. It is when he is outside his municipality that the rural Ilocano most likely appreciates his membership in it. In another setting like Metro Manila or Honolulu, he would prefer his townmates to those from other parts of the province. In Hawaii, many Ilocano organizations are organized around the municipality. There is an association for those hailing from Sarrat or San Nicolas or Vintar.

Voluntary associations constitute other sets of people with whom an individual may experience a sense of commitment. There are a variety of these. At Rangtay, water was provided by several irrigation societies (*zanjera*), some of which began as legally recognized corporations in the 1790s.⁹ Such corporations provide water and services to farmers in Rangtay and dozens of other barangays in the surrounding area. In exchange, the corporations are paid with either a share of the harvest or parcels of land. The corporation thus accumulates communal land (*komun*) which it divides equally, following

a protocol, among all its members. In the Bacarra-Vintar area, the members come from different barangay and may number from 20 to 30 in small *zanjera*, 300 to 1000 in big ones (Lewis 1991). Each society has its own patron saint in honor of whom it celebrates an annual fiesta at its headquarters. The rules of the society oblige its members to donate money and rice to the family of a deceased member, thus further cementing bonds between them.

Karayan had a variety of rotating credit associations (*ammong*) each with a specific purpose: to provide contributions to the family of a deceased member, to give funds for home improvement or even to aid the family of a contestant in the popularity contest. Their organizational structure is clearly dyadic. The members take turns in benefiting from contributions to the fund. With a more clearly corporate character are two cooperatives that have been formed. The first is a consumers' cooperative (1972) which operates a store for the district. The other is a credit cooperative (1979) which extends low-interest loans to members for farm production. But these institutions are not at all common in the Ilocos. Rangtay did not have them. Nor did the loosely-structured barangay studied by Lewis (1971, 151).

The churches have the character of a voluntary association, for members move from one to another depending on the benefit they can derive from it, especially in having their sick healed. Still, not all have well attended activities where positive and frequent interactions occur. Catholic and Aglipayan Sunday services attracted only a dozen people or less. Exceptional was the Rizalist Church at Karayan where a congregation of over sixty met twice a week for the entire morning to listen to long sermons, exchange observations, and have their sick healed by the priestess. Members came in modified Maria Clara and barong tagalog. They regularly had parties at their temple and on special occasions had evening services and parties that lasted till two in the morning.¹⁰

"Community" for the rural Ilocano could mean groups drawn from his bilateral kindred. But these may well live in barangay other than his own. They do not generally constitute a corporate group. A community could also mean either his purok or barangay or his municipality. The importance of any of this for the individual really depends on the situation.¹¹ Finally, community could refer to the voluntary association and church he participates in. The last may take up so much of his time, that he will have little left for his barangay.

Patterns and Interpretations

The following observations can be made on the basis of the three cases presented.

1. The range of types of groups is most varied among Ilocanos and is most restricted among the Ilongot where it consists solely of the bertan. The Tausug occupy an intermediate position.
2. Kinship, along with tradition, is the primary mode of societal integration among the Ilongot, whereas among the Tausug and the Ilocanos there exist non-kinship based modes of integration.
3. Dyadic forms of cooperation form the main source of integration in all three case studies. Still there are various forms of corporateness. Among the Ilongot, corporateness is restricted to the bertan's liability in case of conflict. Below the level of the state, there are several corporate groups among the rural Tausug. Among the rural Ilocanos, there are several corporate groups.

"Community" can vary in meaning, for it is affected by the variety of groups (or lack of it) within a culture. A culture where only one type of group is meaningful will presumably have only one concept of community, while one with several types of groups fosters several concepts of community. Figure 1 (p. 22) is a list per culture of the types of groups meaningful to them.

It is noteworthy that among Ilocanos, there is a wider variety of meaningful groups than among the Tausug and Ilongot. One would expect then that among Ilocanos, an individual cannot be presumed to be attached to only one narrow concept of community. Several may be simultaneously meaningful to him. Thus though the Ilongots, Tausug and Ilocanos share a similar bilateral kinship system, there are important differences.

Though the bertan is not a clan, nonetheless kin ties by blood or marriage, along with continuity of co-residence over several moves, constitute the basic linkage between the members. In the case of the Tausug, despite the brittle quality of their alliances, nonetheless they do adhere to broader communities transcending the kin. They identify with co-religionists and with those living within the same settlement even if these are not their kin. Among Ilocanos, the individual's kin ties are only one linkage among several. There are, in addition, neighborhood in a purok and barangay, co-residence in a municipality, and membership in a church and a voluntary association.

Figure 1. Groups Meaningful for the Ilongot, rural Tausug and rural Ilocano*

The Ilongot:

1. The *bertan*

The rural Tausug:

1. Groups derived from the Ego's close kindred, generally on the father's side, in his area of residence
2. Islam
3. The sultanate

The rural Ilocano:

1. Groups derived from Ego's kindred
 2. The purok or neighborhood
 3. The barangay
 4. The municipality or a district within it
 5. The church of choice
 6. Voluntary associations (note, however, that a church may function as a voluntary association from an individual's perspective)
-

* The "ethnic group," as a type of group, is excluded from this list

To explain differences in the variety of groups and in the importance of kin relations from one area to the other, it is useful to summarize the characteristics of the three social systems in the manner shown in Figure 2.

A conjunction of three factors is responsible for the contrast between the Ilongot on the one hand and the Tausug and the Ilocano on the other. While the latter two had long been sedentary agriculturists, the traditional Ilongot were still practising swidden cultivation. In the uplands, this led to periodic changes of residence and to the break-up of old settlements, for swidden cultivation encourages "centrifugal" settlements (Sahlins 1968, 31). In contrast, the Tausug and the Ilocanos practised sedentary farming which compelled them to live in permanent settlements that grew in density.

Sedentary farming, however, does not by itself compel individuals to establish meaningful ties with non-kinspersons. During the 1900s, the Tinguian and the Bontoc were wet-rice cultivators. And yet headhunting and feuds between settlements not bound together by kinship and propinquity were frequent (Cole 1922; Jenks 1905). Two other factors are crucial.

Figure 2. A Comparison of Three Social Systems

	Ilongot	Taosug	Ilocano
Kinship	Bilateral (uxorilocal)	Bilateral (virilocal)	Bilateral (tending towards virilocality)
Subsistence base	Long-fallow Swidden	Dry rice cultivation on permanent fields with draught animals	Wet rice cultivation on permanent fields with draught animals; increasing mechanization
Property relations	Usufruct over gardens	Individual ownership and tenancy rights	Individual ownership and tenancy rights
Polity	Non-state	Part of a State since 15th century	Part of a State since late 16th century
Class	No classes	Classes based on access to economic and political resources	Classes based on access to economic and political resources
Religion	Local shamans	Universal Church: Islam	Universal Church: Different Christian churches

One important factor is the State. This can be defined as an organization with an institutionalized, formal government, in particular a bureaucracy with several layers of command, that claims ultimate authority over all the residents in not just one settlement but *several* settlements in an area. As the ultimate authority this government exercises three powers. One power arrogates to the state a monopoly on the use of violence. It seeks to disarm its subjects, though not always successfully. Thus, should individuals and their kinspersons enter into conflict with each other, the government of a

state intervenes and imposes its will regardless of what each party may feel. Another power of the state is that it passes laws that are meant to be followed by all its subjects. In a nondemocratic state, such laws are arrived at without consultation; in a democratic state, ideally laws are crafted through consultation with the people. In both situations, the government can impose its laws using its police powers. A third power of the state is that it can extract part of the income and wealth of its subjects through taxation. The maintenance of a formal system of government, officials and bureaucrats, civilian leaders and soldiers, depends upon such revenues (Fried 1967, 67-68, 119; Sahlin 1968, 5-13; Carneiro 1981).

Both the Taosug and the Ilocanos have lived under such a system for centuries, the Taosug since at least the 15th century, the Ilocanos since the late 16th century. Undoubtedly, there are differences in their experience of the state. The Sultanate of Sulu was free and independent until it was absorbed into the Philippines at the turn of the 19th century. It was run by the Taosug nobility, whereas the Ilocanos were ruled by a series of colonial powers only to become independent since 1946. Moreover, it is true that the state's intervention in conflict situations seems rather weak in both cases, particularly among the Taosug. This is one reason why feuds can flare up quite easily and last for generations. Nonetheless, in both cases, people have long gotten used to the notion that there are courts with both the moral authority and the armed capability to impose a decision upon conflicting parties. They may not always bring their conflicts to court but the awareness that there is an authority that can be appealed to and is higher than either of the conflicting parties is present.

Another characteristic of a state is that it promotes urban centers, that is, settlements where the majority of inhabitants are not farmers but rather individuals specializing on a fulltime basis in a particular mental or manual occupation (Sjoberg 1960, 112-13, 121-23). Indeed there has been a close tie between the state and the city. Some have looked at the state as indispensable to the rise of the city anywhere in the world. For the state as an institution depends on two other institutions: one is fulltime specialization in a particular occupation, the other is the emergence of a bureaucratic class whose primary task is running the machinery of everyday government. Both kinds of individuals, non-farming specialists and government bureaucrats, necessarily live together in circumscribed areas or in highly clustered settlements, partly because this facilitates exchange and partly because of security. Relations between individuals or between households within an urban

center are based not on kinship but on the need for goods and services that a household cannot produce. Hence this form of integration can give rise to a sense of community transcending kinship.

Ilongots skilled in oratory and customs could settle disputes among their kin, but not necessarily in cases of conflict between settlements or between kin groupings. For both parties were armed to begin with.¹² Periods of calm since the 1900s were precisely those periods when the American and then the Philippine state increasingly penetrated their society (R. Rosaldo 1980, 257, 262–63, 282). All of these should not be taken as justification for colonialism or for martial rule. They only underline the fact that the state, because of its presumed monopoly on violence, has here and in other societies played an important role in creating a system where nonkin cease to be regarded as potential enemies or threats.¹³

There were no urban centers among traditional Ilongot, for each household could produce most of its basic needs. Moreover, there was no system of taxation to maintain nonfarming bureaucrats. Relations among Ilongots were thus defined almost exclusively in terms of kinship and co-residence, which necessarily excluded those who were nonkin and non-neighbors.

Thus the paradox: while the State and the City are often regarded today, with reason, as the antithesis of the "Community," the two have made an approximation of the ideal form of Community realizable. In any part of the world where the State and the City appeared, be it ancient Egypt, medieval England or 15th century Sulu, they have created horizontal linkages between people unrelated by kinship and residence. Nonetheless it is also true that they either create or exacerbate vertical conflict because they intensify the unequal distribution of wealth and power. Though the Nation-State spawned by the French Revolution sought to democratize the State through universal suffrage, in actual fact, it increased the powers of the State by imposing a single body of laws on all citizens. Previously laws varied according to region, ethnicity, religion or class and so tended to dilute the powers of the state. Toennies was aware of this paradoxical character of the Nation-State (1971, 305). The popularity of "community" in popular discourse today can be interpreted as a reaction against the growing power of faceless, urban-dwelling bureaucrats in a modern state. The modern state has thus generated its own antithesis: movements seeking to vest power in ordinary people and in "communities" poorly defined though these be. Actions indeed lead to the opposite of what was consciously in-

tended, to "unintended consequences," as Anthony Giddens puts it (1981, 28).

A third factor, religion, explains why the Taosug and Ilocano have a broader sense of community. Both Islam and Christianity, historically religions that emerged in states, are universalizing symbolic and organizational systems. They both speak of a brotherhood of all men founded, not on blood or marriage ties, but on belief in a set of precepts and on submission to a single Almighty God. Organizationally, like the state, the center of their power is the urban center where the church and the mosque are located. Hence the adherent who wishes to participate in their rituals finds himself obliged to mix with persons who are neither relatives nor friends, and may even come from a different ethnic background. There may, however, be an important difference between the rural Ilocano and the rural Taosug in this matter. While religious buildings in the Ilocos are owned by a church, as a legally recognized body, some mosques among the Taosug are owned by individual families (Arce 1963). If one therefore frequents a particular mosque, he runs the risk of becoming identified with a particular family or faction. Still there are mosques which are owned directly by the sultan and are therefore neutral ground.

In contrast, Ilongot religion is particularistic. The spirits invoked are those of the immediate surrounding landscape. Moreover, the rituals are conducted within the settlement by shamans who come from the same locality as the participants.

Within both Ilocano and Taosug society, it appears that the meanings of community can be various. This is due to the fact that several factors are pulling at each other simultaneously: the administrative levels of the state, the ego-centered kindred, local residence and affiliation in either a church or a voluntary association.

Between the Taosug and the Ilocano, there are notable differences in the absence or presence of certain groups, as well as in their character. This can be attributed to differences in the nature of the state and the city each has been exposed to. Confirmation of this would require a separate study. For the purposes of this study, some differences can be listed as follows. While neighborhood groups are important in both, it is noteworthy that in some Ilocano areas, these have a highly formal character, being constituted as "associations." It may be that they have been influenced by the proliferation of neighborhood associations in Metro Manila, particularly among the affluent, since the 1950s. Many Ilocano villagers I knew have worked at one time in the metropolitan area but have since returned to the

fields. Taosug and Ilocano settlements also differ in that the latter have voluntary associations. The absence of irrigation societies in the Taosug area is, of course, partly due to the dry plow farming they practice. In the case of the Ilocos, noteworthy is the highly formal, corporate character of the irrigation societies. Though a history of irrigation societies in Ilocos has yet to be written, a few facts are noteworthy. The government of Charles III (q.v. 1759-1788) took particular interest in promulgating better irrigation laws throughout the realm. Subsequent Spanish governments continued this policy and encouraged the formation of irrigation societies, each of which had to draw up its own rules to be submitted to the government for approval (EUIEA 1925, 511-13). The oldest *zanjera* of Ilocos were registered with the Manila government from the 1790s onwards. Significantly enough, during the first half of the 19th century, Ilocos exported high quality rice to China (Fernandez 1955, 165, 188-95). Another type of voluntary association in the Ilocos, the cooperative, is traceable to government efforts, starting in the 1950s, to promote cooperatives. The cooperatives in Teppang and Karayan were begun by private individuals, who consulted government experts. When Kiefer did his study, such government efforts may not yet have begun in Sulu.

Notable in all these is that *Gemeinschaft*-imbued groups in the Ilocos may have sprung up precisely in response to stimuli from *Gesellschaft*-associated institutions such as the State, the City or the Market.

A third noteworthy pattern in this comparison of three cultures is the emphasis on dyadic cooperation as the basis for integration. Corollary to this is the weakness of corporate interests. Corporateness among the Ilongot is confined to the juridical realm. Anyone in the *bertan* is liable to attack by an enemy. Nonetheless, the *bertan* is not able to effectively control the aggressive actions of its members. Land among the Taosug is not corporately owned, liability in case of conflict is individual.

This latter statement can be repeated for the Ilocanos. However, there are various degrees of corporateness. Ambilineal descent groups in some parts of the Ilocos own riceland and woodland as informal corporations. The resources thus owned are called *komun*. But this may be typical only of places like Teppang-Karayan, which is close to wooded hills and suffers perennially from a shortage of both river water and rainfall. Residents at Rangtay found such practices curious and burdensome because they could "lead to quarrels among kinspersons." However, the irrigation societies at Rangtay, as was

shown, do have a pronounced corporate identity. They render service as a unit and are compensated accordingly. Payments of land are divided among the members as equals. Newly formed voluntary associations, like a consumers' cooperative and a credit union, would be expected by Philippine law to act as corporate entities. Whether they, in fact, act accordingly is another matter. While visiting Teppang-Karayan in 1987-88, I was told of a scandal involving the manager of the consumers' cooperative. He had absconded with the sizeable sum of P 20,000. No one thought of bringing him to court, even though he was living at Teppang. Or perhaps that was the problem. Since he had dyadic ties with the various members, as kin, neighbor, and friend, they hesitated to assert the cooperative's corporate rights—even if their own individual interests were being hurt.

The pattern among the Ilongots cited above can be explained partly by the nature of swidden cultivation, partly by their political system. Corporate ownership of land among swidden cultivators does not make sense if there is plenty of forest land available, as seems to have been the case among the Ilongots until the 1960s. Probably as land becomes scarcer due to encroachments by outsiders, they may find it more important to own land either as kin groups or even as the Ilongot ethnic group.

In a nonstate system, the kin, in the case of the Ilongots, the kindred becomes the unit of liability vis-a-vis the offended party in cases of serious conflict. Since there is no higher authority that can impose sanctions, the kin must control and be responsible for its members. When a state forms, however, responsibility tends to be shifted to the individual offender, for a regular court system with a police arm can seek out the offender and punish him.¹⁴ Islamic law singles out the individual for liability when an offense is committed (Schacht 1964, 184-85).¹⁵ This too has been the tradition in Western law. Likewise, despite abuses, this was the spirit of the 19th century Spanish civil code (Robles 1969, 178-80). The latter continues to influence the present civil code. Moreover, in both Islam and Christianity salvation is won individually. It is not the kin, as a group, that enters Paradise, but the individual.

A Comparison with Japanese Society

There are other aspects to the weakness of corporate groups among both the Tausug and the Ilocanos that become evident when we compare them to a country that has lately impressed the Filipino literati

because of its successes, namely, Japan. Both Japanese and foreign scholars have underscored the strong sense of corporatism that has been operative in traditional Japan. But the social infrastructure that made this possible is quite different from what has been the case among Christian and Moslem Filipinos, or in traditional Thailand, Malaysia or Java.

Not all states have emphasized individual responsibility to the same degree as Islam and especially the West have. In traditional Japan, the law held the household head liable for the actions of any of the members, groups of households for the actions of an individual household, the headman for the actions of those in his village. Such actions inevitably compelled the submersion of individual interests within a larger whole especially since the legal code, following Confucian prescription, was not publicly promulgated and was changed from time to time. The individual commoner learned to follow and be ready to assume responsibility for the actions another had taken (Dunn 1989, 11; Noda 1976, 36-37). Traditional Japanese taxation also stressed corporate responsibility, for it was the village or the *buraku*, as a whole, that was taxed rather than the individual members (Rozman 1989, 517, 526-27).¹⁶ Indeed well into the 1950s, the tendency persisted (Beardsley, Hall and Ward 1959, 476-77). Moreover, until the end of World War II, it was the Japanese household, rather than its individual members, that was registered with the government; it was a permanent landholding group (Beardsley, Hall and Ward 1959, 216-17).

In the Philippines, under the Spaniards in the late 19th century, and under American and Filipino governments in the 20th century, individuals formed the unit of taxation. Such has been the case elsewhere in Southeast Asia, including non-colonized Thailand (Kemp 1988, 32). Furthermore, by tradition births and deaths in the Philippines have been individually recorded. And household members may own property separately.

Another point of contrast is that the Japanese kinship system tends to foster a structured organization among members of a kin group regardless of locality. Their descent system, thanks to Confucian influence, is patrilineal; that of Filipinos, Malaysians, Indonesians is cognatic or bilateral. Among the Ilongot, the Taosug, and the Ilocanos, there is considerable room for individual initiative vis-a-vis his kin. A man's leading position among his kinsmen is never guaranteed once and for all by virtue of birth. He must prove himself by his deeds. Nor does he establish ties with all of his kinspersons. He is selective (Kikuchi 1991, 21).

In a patrilineal system such as Japan has had, the eldest male automatically assumes priority over those next in age in perpetuating the lineage (Kikuchi 1991, 20-21). This seems to take place regardless of his own abilities, which contrasts with procedures in the Philippines. Moreover, instead of bilateral kindreds, whose memberships overlap, patrilineal descent groups are discrete entities. Their membership is clear. They do not depend on the individual's choice, for they are determined by birth. Overlapping is impossible, for when a woman marries, she loses membership in her father's descent group even though she retains personal ties with her parents (Maeda 1975, 163). Boundaries, and therefore a corporate identity are sharper in the Japanese system than in Southeast Asia (Kuchiba and Bauzon, 1979). This has been reinforced by the tendency of patrilineal descent groups in Japan to own property as a corporate unit. Such has not been the case, either among the Ilongot or the Taosug. Among the Ilocanos, ownership of woodland by cognatic descent groups is the exception rather than the rule; it is probably found only in areas close to wooded hills.

Discussion

An "Asian communalism" versus "Western individualism" dichotomy overlooks these important particularities that differentiate Philippine cultures from the Japanese. Moreover, it ignores the fact that Western influence upon the Philippines has taken various forms. Some of these merely reinforce preexisting patterns of behavior in the Philippines. Others foster bridges between the individual and those who are neither his kin nor his neighbors.

The kinship system in effect, either in Spain or Britain, has been bilateral. Spanish and American influences upon our kinship system have thus merely reinforced a preexisting bilaterality. Following Spanish practice, Ilocanos like other Christian Filipinos, display both father's and mother's family names on formal documents. Moreover, the Christian emphasis on individual choice has amplified the tendency of bilateral systems to create space for individual choice.

Western influence upon the Philippines has occurred in waves. When critiquing Western influence for fostering individualism, one should be clear as to which wave this is. For some waves have created new bases for community. The earliest wave, beginning in the late 16th century, brought in the State and the Catholic Church.

Together they emphasized individual liability before the courts of Man and of God. At the same time, however, they linked the individual to more encompassing administrative units: the parish and the municipality, at the lowest level; the Universal Church and the Universal Empire at the highest.

During the nineteenth century, nationalism, which was a creation of the French Revolution, came in. As in other places, it preached that the new community called the "Nation" had a more ultimate claim on the individual's allegiance than the Family and the Church. It tied him more closely to this immense group through a compulsory universal school system that taught a new mythology, that of the nation, and through submission to a single set of laws that transcended class, credo or ethnicity. At the same time, the individual's role increased in importance, for every individual of age obtained the right to vote.

The penetration of capitalism into the hinterlands since the latter part of the nineteenth century has also had a dual effect upon notions concerning the individual and the group. Because money as a medium of exchange has become universal and because enterprises are concentrated in distant urban centers, it has induced Ilocano migration not only to the metropolitan area but likewise to Hawaii, California and, lately, to Western Europe and oil-rich countries. Men and women are torn from their spouses, children, and neighbors and must perforce work for many years away from them. Within the urban setting, such migrants learn to compete with others in the free labor market as individuals with particular skills. This thus reinforces an already-existing spirit of competition. Yet it is also true that the notion of forming cooperatives, along with socialism and social democracy, is just as much a Western invention as capitalism. Cooperatives as practised worldwide are based on the principles developed by nineteenth century English workers. Indeed cooperatives and the whole socialist program can be interpreted as a reaction within the matrix of the West itself towards capitalism. We must therefore be more cautious about characterizing the West solely in terms of "individualism" or about using a "West" versus "Asia"¹⁷ dichotomy. When "Western" influence is criticized what is often meant is capitalism. Nonetheless, while cooperatives should indeed be formed, even they need to be critiqued and reconceptualized. English cooperatives began in an industrial context, where presumably workers were cut off from their kin. At present cooperatives in the Philippines are being formed in both the city and the countryside. In the

Filipino countryside, cooperatives ought to consider the fact that the Filipino's loyalty to his kindred may, in a crisis, override loyalty to the cooperative.

There are two ways to approach the concept of "community." One is to examine it as an ideal, desirable construct, the other is to study its empirical content. In this study, I have chosen to take the second approach. In so doing, I have opted for examining "community," not as a geographic but as an emotive concept. I have used it to refer to a group that could be either residential, kinship-based or associational and where common activities, common feelings for each other, and positive interactions exist. Such a concept of community raises problems. First, a method has to be devised for determining the strength of the binding sentiments and the positivity of the interactions. Secondly, it becomes more difficult to define the boundaries of a community. For an individual may actually be participating in several communities. The importance of each varies according to the situation.

Having interpreted three culturally distinct ways of defining community, I tried to explain why they differ. In line with this, I avoided the popular dichotomy of "Asian communalism versus Western individualism." Such simplistic dichotomies overlook the particularities of each case. What we should seek to understand instead are the configurations proper to a particular culture, in other words, the precise relationships linking the individual to society. To use a culinary example: one could posit the dichotomy that while Westerners prefer bread, Asians prefer rice, and, on the basis of this, claim that the Filipino's taste buds are exactly like those of the Japanese. But the dichotomy is not accurate. For rice is a major staple in parts of Spain and Italy. Moreover, while the Tagalog relishes rice fried with plenty of garlic, the Japanese detests the bulb's strong scent as being low class. In exchange, the Japanese habit of eating rice soaked in rice vinegar and sprinkled with sesame seeds and strips of dried seaweed is unappetizing for the average Tagalog. In each culture rice acquires a specific taste, because it enters into a configuration with other elements. This configuration or Gestalt can be arrived at by doing standard anthropological fieldwork: by dialoguing with people about their interpretations of their society, by closely observing their behavior, and by uncovering the social system of which four relevant aspects are: kinship, the economy and ecosystem, the polity, and religion.

To understand people's notions of community, it is not enough therefore that one study a local group. One must situate it vis-a-vis larger forces that affect it, like the central government or the national economy. There is irony in this, given the fact that the State is regarded as the antithesis of the Community. But Homans was right in saying that "the real problem is not how to keep social groups independent and autonomous" but rather how to organize their relation to central control in such a way that they flourish while the center remains strong (1950, 467). One should also be sensitive to variations in the ecosystem within the same region. Thus, even within Ilocos Norte, there was a marked contrast in notions of solidarity between inland, slightly upland, water-poor barangays, on the one hand, and a coastal, well-watered barangay on the other (Zialcita 1989). So as not to complicate the cross-cultural analysis of this study, I did not bring this in. But it is well-worth considering in studying a region.

"Community" is often discussed in connection with patterns of cooperation; I have proposed understanding patterns of conflict as well. While vertical forms of conflict, that is, class conflict, have called much attention within recent years, lateral forms of conflict, that is, between settlements or families of the same social status have not. And yet Philippine languages make a crucial distinction between "we-excluding-you" (*kami*) and "we-including-you" (*tayo*). Alliances continually shift: an insider to one group may in the course of time become an outsider. The opposite pattern also happens. An appeal to cooperation or to a "common good" may therefore not always work, for people may prefer recognition within the tiny circles that they value. "Conflict is built deeply into any social order, which would be uninteresting without it," observes Homans (1950: 465). And yet when handled properly, conflict can be transformed into a friendly competition that can benefit the participants.

At Karayan, both cooperative ventures and friendly competition have improved the quality of life for the residents. Cooperative ventures would be informal rotating credit associations that provide some form of insurance to the members by compelling all to contribute a fixed amount of rice and money to the family of the deceased. This practice has been incorporated into a more modern form of cooperative: the credit union. On the other hand, the yearly contest between the five barangays is an example of friendly competition with both material and social benefits. During the campaign period, ri-

valries between purok in the barangay are set aside. No doubt, the contest taps latent rivalries between barangay. But the activity itself of competing for a prize helps make residents of the competing barangays aware of each other. The tabulation on the eve of the fiesta compels the five member barangays to bodily participate. Many eagerly attend this all-night affair and, of course, the coronation night during the fiesta. The possibilities and limitations of friendly competition for creating a broader sense of community deserve investigation.¹⁸

Perhaps "indigenization"—another favorite word today—should be conceived of not merely as a return to an original unadulterated culture. Such reductionism is impractical, for new needs keep arising. Indigenization is better conceived of as involving first, a deeper understanding of traditional ways, whether these involve cooperation or conflict; and second, as a reinterpretation and a rechanneling of these ways towards new goals. A reinterpretation and a rechanneling, however, might at times mean using ways that came from elsewhere but could be appropriate if modified.¹⁹ In some of the Ilocano villages indigenization is, in fact, proceeding according to those two steps. Patterns of cooperation (e.g., contributions to the family of the deceased) and patterns of conflict (e.g., competition between barangay) have been wedded into new institutions: the credit union and the annual fund-raising district contest. Parallel examples can, no doubt, be found elsewhere in the country and should be documented because of their valuable lessons.²⁰ The skilled sculptor works with, rather than against, the fissures in the wood.

Notes

1. Toennies does not use the two concepts as tools for classifying social phenomena, the way the botanist distinguishes "trees and grasses." These concepts are meant to decompose social phenomena into their constitutive elements. Toennies compares himself to a chemist who seeks the isolation (*Scheidung*) of elements rather than to a biologist who defines a distinction (*Unterscheidung*) between organisms (1971, 91).

2. Overviews of the various uses of the term, "community" are found in the following: Miner (1968), Seymour-Smith (1986), Bates and Bacon (1972), Lee and Newby (1983).

3. Toennies anticipated this use of *Gemeinschaft*. For he agrees with the statement that on 4 August 1914 (when World War I erupted), "the German people became a community" (1971, 68).

4. This is the position taken by the geographer, Robert Reed (1971, 7). The social, economic, and political implications of long fallow swidden for patterns of behavior in the Philippines, for instance for the sense of "community," have yet to be understood.

5. If the Ilongots, like the 16th century Visayans, had been practising long-fallow swidden cultivation by the sea with its abundant resources, they might well have developed settlements that were relatively permanent, larger, and consequently with a pronounced class structure where slave ownership was important as a source of wealth. For a reconstruction of early Visayan society, see Scott (1982, 96-126).

6. The Austronesian family of languages includes the languages of the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Micronesia, Polynesia, Madagascar and the non-Chinese uplanders of Taiwan. It is preferable to the misleading "Malayo-Polynesian."

7. For accounts of stranger-killing for various reasons among the early Tagalogs and Visayans, see Chirino (1969, 328) and Alzina (n.d.: III, 14/217: 1-18). Isabelo de los Reyes (1968, 235) mentions the custom as still in practice (though feared) in parts of the Ilocos during the late 19th century. So does Cole (1922, 373) referring to an incident in Bangui, Ilocos Norte in 1907. It has also been reported of the Bontoc (Jenks 1905), Kalinga (Dozier 1967, 59), the Tinguian (Cole 1922, 372-74) as well as of aboriginal groups in Formosa, Malaysia, and Indonesia, for instance, the Batak of Sumatra (Bartlett 1973, 26, 38). The implications of this tradition for present efforts in building a broad sense of community need to be explored.

8. Kiefer (1972, 12) translates *kauman* as "community." I prefer not to do so, for obvious reasons.

9. These corporations were registered with the Spanish government in Manila, as their records show. It would be worthwhile figuring out what are Spanish and what are local patterns in the *zanjera's* organization. Irrigation societies abound in Valencia and the Spanish Levant. On a visit, I witnessed members settling their disputes at the famous Tribunal de las aguas which is held once a week at the portal of the cathedral of Valencia.

10. Among my happiest memories of fieldwork are these nocturnal vigils that began with long liturgies and were followed with healing rituals, trances, and feasting. The term *Gemeinde* in German refers to a religious congregation. This *Gemeinde* was certainly full of *Gemeinschaft*.

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